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This paper examines the role of bequests and inter vivos gifts in the U.S. economy,
considering their importance in determining (i)the economy’s aggregate capital stock,
(ii)the distribution of private net worth, and (iii)public policy outcomes and options. It
focuses on several recent calibrated simulations.
There is a longstanding debate in the economics literature about the relative impor-
tance of life–cycle and bequest–motivated wealth accumulation (e.g., Modigliani [1988]).
The same issue arises in analysis, for example, of the well–known simulation model of
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987]: in the ultimate variant of the model (in Ch.11), pure life–
cycle incentives do not fully account for the U.S. capital stock. The omission of private
intergenerational transfers might explain the shortfall.
There is little disagreement that the U.S. distribution of private net worth is highly
concentrated (e.g., Wolﬀ [1996]). In the 1995 SCF, the top 5 percent of wealth holders
account for 56% of private U.S. net worth, the top 1 percent hold 35%, and the Gini
coeﬃcient is .79. Even after adjusting for private pensions and consumer durables (see
Laitner [2001]), the shares are 48% and 28%, respectively, and the Gini is .73. Put another
way, mean net worth per household (in the original data)is $212,000, but the median
is only $57,000. It seems that a complete model of saving might require two types of
households: a small group who have enormous net worth, and a large group who have
little.
The diﬀerent policy implications of the life–cycle and the simplest altruistic model are
well–known: in a life–cycle model, national debt and unfunded social security crowd out
private capital accumulation (e.g., Diamond [1965]); in a representative–agent incarnation
of the altruistic model, debt and social security may well have no eﬀect on capital at all
(e.g., Barro [1974]). In fact, the economy’s equilibrium capital intensivity is almost always
1an issue in the former model; in the latter, it tends to be aﬀected through taxes on estates
and the income of capital (e.g., Chamley [1986], Lucas [1990]).
This paper reviews three models with bequests, considering their merits. Then it
describes several recent calibration studies.
Framework
We ﬁrst present several variants of a very stylized model. It has a closed economy with
an aggregate production function. There are no business cycles. We focus on steady–state
equilibria. Households are born with diﬀering earning abilities — the distribution of the
latter being exogenous and stationary — but they all have the same preference orderings.
We assume that even if parent households care about the utility of their descendants,
altruism does not ﬂow the other direction (eg, Laitner [1997]).
Each household lives at most two periods, supplying 1 unit of labor in the ﬁrst, and
0 in the second. A household has one adult, and he raises one child. The child leaves
home as the parent retires. If a household’s consumption is c1 in youth, the corresponding
utility ﬂow is Uyoung(c1); if the household’s consumption is c2 in old age, the utility ﬂow
is Uold(c2). A household’s probability of being alive in old age is q ∈ [0,1]. Consider a
steady state with constant wage w and interest rate r. There is a proportional tax on
intergenerational transfers σ, but we omit income taxes.
In a pure life–cycle world with “actuarially fair” annuities, there are no inheritances,




z · w − s

+ q · Uold
s · (1 + r)/q

} , (1)
where s is life–cycle saving. This is our version of, say, the model of Auerbach and Kot-
likoﬀ [1987]. There will be a distribution of asset holdings by the elderly, reﬂecting the
distribution of z, and there will be a distribution of earnings among the young.
2Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the overall economy. With a Cobb–
Douglas aggregate production function, the ratio of factor shares is constant; hence, the
capital stock divided by the wage bill, say, K/(w·L), must be proportional to the reciprocal
of the interest rate. That sets the “demand for capital” curve. At each prospective steady–
state r, the life–cycle model determines average net worth per household divided by average
earnings, say, W/(w·L). That determines the steady–state “supply of capital” curve, say,
ab. The intersection of the curves determines the economy’s steady–state equilibrium. An
upward sloping supply curve, as illustrated by ab, would be typical in this case.
There are a number of ways to incorporate intergenerational transfers. First, suppose





i + z · w − s

+ q · Uold
s · (1 + r)

} . (2)
With no access to annuities, the household’s rate of return on life–cycle saving is lower. If
the household remains alive in its second period of life, its bequest is 0; if it dies, its heir
inherits s · (1 + r) · (1 − σ).
Suppose estates pass from parents to their children. Solution of (2)yields a function
s = S(i,z). This and mortality determine a Markov process over contemporaneous pairs
(i,z). Provided the process has a stationary distribution, one can determine a stationary
cross sectional distribution of net worth, and then average net worth. Each r then maps
to a point on Figure 1’s supply curve. This is the model of Gokhale et al. [2001]. There is
no reason to expect the supply curve’s shape to diﬀer qualitatively from ab. Call this the
“accidental bequest” model.
A second model assumes a parent derives a ﬂow of utility from his bequest. Restore
annuities. Let bequest b yield utility F

b · (1 − σ)

to its donor. A parent with earning









b · (1 + r) · (1− σ)

+ q · U
old
s · (1 + r)/q

} . (3)
Maximization determines the child’s inheritance, say, i , as a function of i and z: i  =
I(i,z)=( 1+r) · (1− σ) · b. Again we have a Markov process on pairs (i,z)and can hope
to generate a supply curve for Figure 1. Altig et al. [2001] is a recent simulation study
in this vein. Again, we expect a supply–curve shape resembling ab. Call this the “joy of
giving” model.
A third model assumes a parent cares about his descendants’ utility. Suppose that
each parent cares about his own lifetime utility; that of his child, though weighted by
ξ ∈ (0,1]; that of his grandchild, weighted by ξ2; etc. Assume nature reveals each person’s
earning ability when the latter is a child. Let parent and child abilities be uncorrelated
(though this is merely for simplicity). Let V be a young parent’s total utility, summing
his lifetime utility with what he vicariously derives from his descendants. Then we have a
Bellman equation: for a parent with earning ability z and inheritance i,
V (i,z)=m a x
s≥0,b(z)≥0
{Ez[Uyoung





b(z ) · (1 + r) · (1 − σ),z 
+ q · Uold
s · (1 + r)/q

]} , (4)
where z  is the child’s ability. Letting the child’s inheritance be i , maximization determines
i  = I(i,z,z ). Given exogenous distributions for z and z , one can deﬁne a Markov
process from tuples (i,z)to ( i ,z ). Laitner [2001] shows the process generates a unique
stationary distribution. If we collapse the distribution of earnings to a point, we have
the familiar “representative agent” model. Its supply curve in Figure 1 is well–known
to be a horizontal line, say, cd (for cases with b>0). The line’s height depends on
4preference and demographic parameters and on tax rates. Laitner [2001] shows that with
a distribution of abilities, Figure 1’s supply curve resembles ef, bounded above by the line
cd and asymptotic to it. Call this the “altruistic” model.
Turning to comparisons of the bequest models, we know surveys show roughly half
of U.S. households ultimately inherit (eg, Laitner and Ohlsson [2001]). Model 2 can be
consistent with this: only parents dying young bequeath. Model 3 is easily consistent as
well: parents with high inheritances and/or earnings bequeath; low resource parents do not
— lodging at a “corner solution” with b = 0. Model 1, on the other hand, will generally
not yield this outcome without a very specialized F.
Survey evidence also implies that inter vivos gifts are substantial in aggregate (eg, Gale
and Scholz [1994]). For consistency with this, model 1 would generally require separate
utility functions for bequests and gifts. It is diﬃcult to see how the accidental model would
ever explain gifts — which are certainly intentional. Altruistic parents, on the other hand,
might well transfer both gifts and bequests (eg, Laitner [2001]).
A lack of annuity markets is a key assumption of the accidental model. In practice, pri-
vate pensions often incorporate annuities, but independent annuities are rare. The conven-
tional explanation is that adverse selection makes these securities unattractive. However,
the introduction notes that a miniscule group of wealthy households noticeably aﬀect total
U.S. net worth. It seems likely that insurers could oﬀer individually–tailored annuities
to very wealthy individuals, administering thorough health examinations to circumvent
adverse selection. Yet, this virtually never seems to happen in practice.
Existing evidence on the division of estates within families shows a tendancy toward
equal shares, regardless of siblings’ job market success (eg, Laitner [1997]). This is contrary
to the altruistic model, but not to the other two. For consistency with altruism, one might
have to argue that social norms demand equal division of estates.
If government conﬁscates accidental estates, donors should not care. The latter seems
5inconsistent with the estate planning which wealthy individuals often undertake.
Finally, recent regression results in Laitner and Juster [1996], Altonji et al. [1997], and
Laitner and Ohlsson [2001] display sign patterns consistent with the altruistic model but
not our other two: private transfers seem negatively related to descendant earning abilities
(though positively related to donor resources). Nevertheless, Altonji et al. develop a
quantitative parameter restriction consequent to altruism, and their data rejects it by a
wide margin. Laitner and Ohlsson also reject it. In the end, outcomes see ambiguous.
One possible problem is that actual intergenerational transfers presumably follow from a
mixture of motives (eg, Nishiyama [2001]), and statistical speciﬁcations should take this
into account. Another is that most surveys have a thin sample of rich households — the
very group for whom bequest incentives are probably most powerful.
Simulation Models
As noted, recent examples of calibrated simulation models include Altig et al. [2001]
with “joy of giving” bequests and Laitner [2001] with “altruistic” bequests. Both calibrate
their model to aggregate U.S. net worth. Each has life–cycle and transfer–motivated wealth
accumulation, and both provide a breakdown between the two. The fractions due to life–
cycle saving alone are, respectively, .70 and .67. In other words, both ﬁnd life–cycle saving
to be the major explanation for U.S. wealth accumulation.
The distribution of private wealth is much more concentrated than the distribution of
earnings. Existing work suggests life–cycle saving can explain only a small amount of the
diﬀerence (eg., Huggett [1996]). Bequests seem a natural candidate to explain the rest.
Gokhale et al. [2001] incorporate accidental bequests. Their framework includes re-
alistic life spans, lifetime earnings proﬁles, mortality tables, fertility patterns, and social
security. They calibrate the distribution of earning abilities from the 1995 SCF. Their ﬂow
utility function, our U above, is isoelastic, U(c)=cγ/γ. Their model is very tractable
6since they assume γ = −∞. Although a high degree of curvature is not unpreceded in
the literature on risk aversion, it implies, for example, that elderly households will hold
as much wealth as if they were inevitably going to live to the maximal age. The paper
focuses on the distribution of wealth for households aged 60–69. Empirical concentration
in that range is not too diﬀerent from the overall distribution: the shares of the top 5
and 1 percent are, respectively, 51 and 30%, and the Gini coeﬃcient is .73. In the best
simulation, the top shares are 49 and 33%, respectively, and the Gini is .67.
Laitner [2001] uses an altruistic model. The demographic framework is simpler than
Gokhale et al. but otherwise similar. The paper carefully speciﬁes the earning distribution
and the Federal estate tax. Flow utility is again isoelastic, and the paper jointly calibrates
γ and our intergenerational weight ξ to match aggregate net worth and estate tax revenues.
In the ultimate simulation, ξ = .82 and γ = .70. Thus, parents care almost as much about
their grown children as about themselves, and households are surprisingly tolerant of risk.
A si nt h ec a s eo fG o k h a l eet al., the model is able to match the empirical distribution of
wealth: simulating over all ages, the shares of the top 5 and 1 percent are, respectively, 43
and 25%, and the Gini coeﬃcient is .75.
Policy Implications
Long–run policy implications tend to depend heavily on the shape of Figure 1’s supply
curve. Think about the life–cycle model, with curve ab. Add a perpetual national debt D.
Then we must move to a higher steady–state interest rate, the rate at which household net
worth exceeds the business sector’s demand for capital exactly by D. In the representative
agent dynastic model, with supply cd, the same logic shows no change in the equilibrium
interest rate is necessary — a manifestation of Barro’s famous “Ricardian equivalence.”
One does not expect accidental or joy of giving bequests to aﬀect the shape of supply
curve ab. With altruism and heterogeneous earning abilities, on the other hand, Ricardian
7results follow if equilibrium lies in the (nearly)horizontal part of supply curve ef,w h e r e a s
life–cycle results follow if equilibrium lies to the left, in the steeper range of the curve.
Laitner’s [2001] best calibration points to an equilibrium in the former region. Then one’s
attention turns to the position of the horizontal asymptote — which marginal tax rates,
for example, aﬀect.
Conclusion
A number of models of bequest behavior seem able to account for aggregate wealth
accumulation — though recent studies show life–cycle saving accounting for most of the
total. Perhaps more interesting, several models with bequests and a realistic distribution
of earning abilities replicate the extreme concentration of the empirical distribution of
private wealth. In at least one of these models, private intergenerational transfer behavior
is capable of generating dramatic policy implications.
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